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Abstract 
 
Criminologists have long used the concept of social control to consider the ways in 
which societies respond to individuals or groups regarded as deviant or problematic. 
Although it is generally recognized that law and its enforcement is a cornerstone of 
social control, there is very little research on how human rights law might fulfil a social 
control function. Through an examination of a purposive sample of cases adjudicated by 
the European Court of Human Rights, we show how human rights law can facilitate 
forms of upward, inward and downward social control in contemporary societies. Our 
overall conclusion is that human rights law enables, produces and shapes contemporary 
practices of social control, often with significant and far-reaching consequences.   
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Introduction 
 
In this article we examine the relationship between human rights law and social control 
in a way that may appear counter-intuitive. Rather than considering human rights law as 
a means by which individuals resist the regulation of their conduct Ð which is how 
human rights law is often understood Ð we examine how human rights law can produce 
new and intensify existing forms of social control. Our aim is to demonstrate that 
human rights law - which codifies Ôabstract valuesÕ and endorses Ôsocial practices to 
realize those valuesÕ (Donnelly, 2013: 11) Ð plays a significant role in shaping the 
control of individual or group behaviours designated as deviant or problematic in 
contemporary societies (Cohen, 1985).  
 
We begin by providing an overview of the concept of social control and explaining why 
human rights law, like other forms of law, can be considered to have a social control 
function. We then outline our methodology and describe the empirical data that we use 
throughout the article. We go on, through an analysis of the empirical data, to show 
three key ways in which human rights law fulfils a social control function. First, we 
demonstrate how individuals can use human rights law as a mechanism to achieve 
upward social control resulting in the regulation of state agents. Secondly, we illustrate 
how individuals can utilize human rights law to achieve forms of inward social control 
resulting in some individuals becoming subject to regulation by state agents. Thirdly, 
we show how unsuccessful attempts by individuals to use human rights law can result in 
an endorsement and legitimization of forms of downward social control favoured by 
state agents. In conclusion, we argue that human rights law provides an important arena 
in which the definition of and response to deviant behaviours is determined and, 
consequently, makes a significant contribution to shaping patterns of social control in 
contemporary societies.  
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Social control, law, and human rights  
 
Social control is a concept that has been used by criminologists and other social 
scientists since the late nineteenth century. The concept of social control originated in 
explanations of how Ôthat ascendency over the aims and acts of the individual which is 
exercised on behalf of the groupÕ is achieved (Ross, 1896: 519). The concept of social 
control has been used widely (for a discussion see Lowman et al., 1987) and, as a result, 
developed diverse and multiple meanings (for a discussion of the history of social 
control, both as a concept and as a practice, see: Melossi, 1990; Melossi, 2013). For 
example, within sociology, from the 1980s onwards, the consensus has been that there 
are three basic types of social control: informal, legal, and medical (Chriss, 2007). 
However, criminologists and other social scientists have conceptualized social control 
very differently. Cohen, for example, understood social control as Ôthe organized ways 
in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, 
worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable in some way or anotherÕ (1985: 1). 
By contrast, Foucault (1988) and Mead (1934) considered, albeit in different ways, how 
social control is achieved through self-surveillance or self-control (for a discussion, see: 
Deflem, 2015).   
 
Although the concept of social control has been conceptualized in very different ways, 
it is generally recognized that a key way in which social control is produced and 
sustained in contemporary societies is through law and legal practices (Innes, 2003). For 
instance, social control can be achieved by legislatures through the making of statute 
law, or by practitioners, such as police officers or social workers, who implement and 
enforce law (Cohen, 1985: 3). Through law, contemporary societies pursue a variety of 
social control objectives, such as crime prevention, public safety, and the rehabilitation 
of individual offenders. More generally, law facilitates social control by providing a 
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mechanism by which Ôpeople hold each other to standards, explicitly or implicitly, 
consciously or notÕ and a means by which individuals become classified as Ôthose who 
are respectable and those who are notÕ (Black, 1976: 105).  
 
When criminologists and other scholars have considered the relationship between law 
and social control they have tended to focus on the criminal law (for example, Pound, 
1942; Black, 1984), although other forms of law have sometimes been examined (for 
example Smart, 1989; Roach Anleu, 1998). Previous considerations of the relationship 
between law and social control have, in essence, been concerned with how law shapes 
Ôthe normative life of a state and its citizensÕ (Black, 1976: 2) and functions Ôto guide 
behaviour via a system of sanctionsÕ (Chriss, 2007: 38). Different Ôstyles of lawÕ have 
been recognized to be connected to different Ôstyle[s] of social control found more 
widely in social lifeÕ (Black, 1976: 4). Despite this, however, virtually no consideration 
has been given to whether human rights law functions as a mechanism for 
implementing, developing or sustaining social control in contemporary societies.  
 
Even Cohen, a sociologist who conducted extensive research on both social control and 
human rights, seldom considered how human rights law may be deployed as a 
mechanism of social control (Cohen, 1985, 1993, 2001; see also Downes et al., 2007). 
Some scholars have critically analysed the ways in which human rights and human 
rights law interact with criminal justice systems and criminal justice practices (see, for 
example: Amatrudo and Blake, 2014; Weber, Fishwick and Marmo, 2014) and thereby 
provided an implicit consideration of how human rights law interacts with forms of 
social control. In a rare explicit consideration of the relationship between human rights 
and social control, Innes notes that human rights can provide a form of Ômeta controlÕ 
over the legal systems of countries (Innes, 2003: 43). There has, however, been no 
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systematic consideration of how human rights law might function to regulate the 
conduct of individuals or groups. 
 
Consequently, the idea that human rights law can fulfil a social control function is alien 
to most contemporary debates about human rights. In lay discourse, human rights are 
usually discussed, either positively or negatively, as a mechanism for enabling 
individuals to exercise greater agency in their everyday lives and, therefore, as a means 
to resist forms of social control. Similarly, in scholarly or expert discourse, human 
rights are frequently considered as a framework through which individuals maximize 
their sovereignty (see, for example, Madsen at al., 2013; Baxi, 2002). In essence, human 
rights law is commonly understood as the means to achieve respect for Ôhuman 
freedomÕ (C.R. v the United Kingdom, 1995: para. 42) rather than a means to achieve 
social control. Although social control practices are often considered in terms of how 
they negatively impact upon human rights Ð for instance, in respect of impairing or 
violating rights (see, for example, International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2010; 
Blower et al., 2012) Ð the potential for human rights to instigate or sustain forms of 
social control over individuals is almost never discussed.  
 
The absence of a consideration of the relationship between social control and human 
rights law is striking given that human rights law, like other forms of law, codifies 
particular values Ð giving, what Durkheim described as, the Ôstability and precisionÕ of 
law to particular forms of social morality (1893 [1933]: 65) Ð and allows these values to 
be translated, through judicial decision making and mechanisms of enforcement, into 
outcomes aimed at reshaping the conduct and practices of individuals and groups. In 
this sense, human rights law provides a mechanism to compel individuals to behave in 
particular ways and, therefore, functions in a similar way to other legal means by which 
Ôthe individual finds himself [sic] in the presence of a force which dominates him and to 
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which he must bowÕ (Durkheim, 1895 [1982]: 143). Human rights law can therefore 
shape perceptions of deviance in contemporary societies, encourage obedience among a 
general population in respect of defined parameters of acceptable behaviour, and result 
in sanctions against those whose behaviour does not conform to or comply with such 
parameters (for a general discussion of these aspects of social control, see Chriss, 2007: 
33). As we will show below, human rights law is a key aspect of the Ôcontrol patternsÕ 
of contemporary societies and a mechanism for creating Ôboth change and stabilityÕ in 
their social orders (Cohen, 1985: 4). 
 
Methodology and sample: the European Court of Human Rights 
 
In order to explore the relationship between human rights law and social control we 
examine the work of one of the most important human rights organizations in the world, 
the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter Ôthe CourtÕ). The Court is an 
international court that was established by the Council of EuropeÕs Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Ð more commonly referred to 
as the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter Ôthe ConventionÕ) Ð that 
entered into force in 1953. First acting as a part-time institution in collaboration with 
the former European Commission of Human Rights, the Court has sat as a full-time and 
permanent court since 1998 examining complaints brought against nation states about 
alleged violations of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. As a result of 
the expansion of the Council of Europe to include 47 European states, the CourtÕs 
caseload has significantly expanded and, in the last year for which statistics are 
available, it disposed of 85,951 applications judicially (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2017).  
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The extensive case law of the Court provides one aspect of the empirical data used 
throughout this article. We draw upon a purposive sample of six of the CourtÕs 
judgments to provide an in-depth analysis of three key ways in which Convention 
jurisprudence is implicated in aspects of social control. The six judgments were chosen 
on the basis that they are representative of three key aspects of the CourtÕs case law: 
two of the judgments (Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria (2007) and S. and Marper v the 
United Kingdom (2008)) represent cases in which a state has been found to have 
violated the Convention and readily complies with requirements set down by the Court; 
two of the judgments (Moldovan and Others v Romania (no. 2) (2005) and Alekseyev v 
Russia (2010)) represent cases in which a state has been found to have violated the 
Convention but resists or delays complying with requirements set down by the Court; 
and two of the judgments (Vala!inas v Lithuania (2001) and Ramirez Sanchez v France 
(2005, 2006)) represent cases in which a state has been found not to have violated the 
Convention and therefore does not need to comply with any requirements. The six 
judgments were also chosen to represent two types of applications that commonly come 
before the Court: applications that allege that state officials have perpetrated a violation 
of rights guaranteed by the Convention (therefore failing to meet negative obligations 
under the Convention), and applications that allege that state officials have failed to 
provide adequate safeguards against a violation of rights guaranteed by the Convention 
(therefore failing to meet positive obligations under the Convention). We also draw 
upon other case law selectively to illustrate our arguments.  
 
Whilst an analysis of case law has methodological and epistemological limitations Ð it 
does not, for instance, permit access to any of the Ôback stageÕ work that underpins its 
production Ð it allows an understanding of the wide range of processes and practices 
that make up a juridical field (Bourdieu, 1987). Furthermore, although Court judgments 
can be seen as highly stylized and reified representations, they are usually the only 
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means by which judges make publically available their reasoning. An analysis of case 
law is therefore a key means by which it is possible to observe how the administration 
of human rights law is implicated in contemporary patterns of social control.  
 
A second aspect of the empirical data used throughout this article are documents which 
relate to the execution of the CourtÕs judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. Judgments of the Court are ultimately declaratory commands similar 
to other forms of legal judgments: they are authoritative statements that seek to compel 
states, and the individuals in them, towards particular forms of action and behaviour. 
This aspect of the Court is what makes it a popular destination for applicants. Whilst the 
Court forms just one element of the more general juridification of contemporary 
European societies (Habermas, 1989), applicants know that a favourable judgment in 
the Court can have widespread effects throughout Europe and beyond. A judgment by 
the Court can reshape social control practices throughout 47 states and influence the 
lives of up to 800 million people within them. However, the capacity of the CourtÕs 
jurisprudence to act as a form of governmental social control (Black, 1976: 2) depends 
upon the effectiveness of its execution. Unless one accepts command theories of law 
(for example, Olivecrona, 1971) it is important to recognize that the existence of the 
CourtÕs jurisprudence does not in itself ÔdoÕ anything. Human rights law, like all Ôpaper 
lawÕ, requires a machinery of enforcement in order to translate it into action and the 
Committee of Ministers functions as the CourtÕs machinery of enforcement. 
 
The Committee of Ministers supervises compliance by states with the requirements of 
the CourtÕs judgments. The Court is often regarded as ÔweakÕ because the Committee of 
Ministers has no direct power to compel states to comply with judgments, save for the 
possibility of suspending a member stateÕs right of representation and terminate its 
membership of the Council of Europe (Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949: Article 
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8). Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that compliance with judgments is high (Bates, 
2010) although variable across states (von Staden, 2012). Compliance with judgments 
can often be slow and piecemeal, resulting in lengthy negotiations with states over the 
changes they are prepared to implement. Two cases that we discuss below, Moldovan 
and Others v Romania (no. 2) (2005) and Alekseyev v Russia (2010), are good examples 
of the weaknesses prevalent at the enforcement stage. In the first case, the Romanian 
authorities finally complied with the CourtÕs judgment ten years after it was handed 
down, and in the second case Russian authorities have still not complied with the 
judgment eight years after it was finalized.  
 
We trace the life of the judgments in our sample through the execution stage (where this 
was required) in order to show the process by which judgments become translated into 
social control practices. Through an analysis of the case work of the Committee of 
Ministers we show how states respond to judgments by implementing individual and 
general measures and, in doing so, how these measures have an impact Ôon the groundÕ 
in respect of social control. Although the effectiveness of the Court and international 
law generally should not be overplayed Ð existing research shows, for example, that 
human rights law has variable influence on the working practices of criminal justice 
professionals (Costigan and Thomas, 2005; Donald et al., 2009; Bullock and Johnson, 
2012) Ð our analysis shows how the work of the Committee of Ministers can influence 
those Ôstreet-level bureaucratsÕ (Lipsky, 1980) charged with social control functions. 
Therefore, as we show below, the successful execution of a judgment by the Court can 
have profound implications for social control practices in contemporary European 
states.  
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Human rights law and social control in action 
 
In this section we examine the relationship between human rights law and social control 
in respect of the CourtÕs jurisprudence. We draw upon a purposive sample of six 
judgments of the Court in order to consider three key ways in which the CourtÕs 
jurisprudence contributes to patterns of social control throughout the member states of 
the Council of Europe. First, we consider how the CourtÕs jurisprudence can instigate 
forms of social control over agents or officials within member states. Second, we 
explore how the CourtÕs jurisprudence can give rise to the regulation of private 
individuals within member states. Finally, we show how the CourtÕs jurisprudence can 
legitimize forms of social control pursued by member states.  
 
The social control of state agents 
 
In this section we consider two cases, Moldovan and Others v Romania (no.2) (2005) 
and S. and Marper v the United Kingdom (2008), which concerned complaints made by 
individuals in Romania and the United Kingdom about the conduct of state agents who 
were charged with carrying out law enforcement activities. In both cases, the Court 
upheld the complaints and, in doing so, required the Romanian and United Kingdom 
governments to introduce new forms of regulation in respect of the behaviour of state 
agents. The respective governments responded in very different ways to the CourtÕs 
judgments: as we noted above, in Moldovan and Others the Romanian national 
authorities took 10 years to comply with the CourtÕs judgment, whereas in S. and 
Marper the United Kingdom national authorities complied in a relatively short amount 
of time. Although the compliance of national authorities with the CourtÕs judgments 
can, as we show below, produce far reaching consequences for the regulation of state 
officials, these cases show that the effectiveness of human rights law is significantly 
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affected by the manner in which national authorities respond during the execution 
process. 
 
In Moldovan and Others a group of Roma individuals complained to the Court about 
the unlawful destruction of their homes by police officers and the very poor conditions 
in which they were subsequently forced to live. The complainants further submitted that 
they were victims of discrimination, on account of their ethnicity, by judicial bodies and 
officials. They complained to the Court that the actions against them had caused them 
Ôconsiderable mental suffering, thus diminishing their human dignity and arousing in 
them such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasementÕ (2005: para. 110). In 
upholding the complaints, the Court considered that Romanian state agents had fallen 
short of protecting the Roma individualsÕ human rights. Notably, the Court held that the 
way in which the complainantsÕ grievances were dealt with by the national authorities 
was discriminatory and amounted to a form of degrading treatment prohibited by the 
Convention. As a consequence of the judgment, the Romanian national authorities were 
required to implement general measures designed to ensure that no further violation of 
this kind would happen in the future.  
 
To comply with the CourtÕs judgment, the Romanian national authorities can be seen to 
have instigated new forms of regulation over the conduct of state officials in respect of 
their treatment of Roma people. This regulation originated in the commitment of the 
Romanian national authorities to eradicate racial discrimination within the judicial and 
policing systems, and to remove stereotypes, prejudices and discriminatory practices 
against the Roma community in public institutions. Through negotiations with the 
Committee of Ministers, the Romanian national authorities proactively identified 
appropriate practices to prevent and fight discrimination against Roma people by stage 
agents. These measures included thematic training seminars for magistrates, public 
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officials and other civil servants. The overall aim of the Romanian national authorities 
was to prevent future human rights violations by stimulating the inclusion of Roma 
people in the economic, social, educational, cultural and political life of the local 
community. 
 
The Romanian national authorities were required to evidence their claim that they had 
implemented general measures that satisfied the judgment of the Court. In this respect, 
they provided evidence that general measures had contributed to changing police 
practices and cited, as an example of this, an incident involving three citizens of Roma 
origin and another Romanian citizen which the police had responded to in a manner 
designed to ensure that the local population did not react in an adverse way towards the 
Roma community and, consequently, that the Roma community were protected from 
possible attacks motivated by hatred. The Committee of Ministers was satisfied that the 
Romanian national authorities had, amongst other things, undertaken measures to 
ensure Ôthe prevention against discrimination of this [Roma] community by the local 
authoritiesÕ and, on this basis, decided to close the examination of the case (Resolution 
39, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 March 2016). The outcome of the 
case can therefore be seen to have resulted in the introduction of ÔsoftÕ social controls 
aimed at reshaping the beliefs of state agents, with the ambition of regulating their 
conduct (Innes, 2003: 7).  
 
In S. and Marper, two individuals complained about the retention of their DNA 
samples/profiles and fingerprints by the police after they were charged with, but not 
subsequently convicted of, recordable criminal offences. At the relevant time, the police 
were lawfully entitled to retain fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles obtained 
from those charged with a recordable offence and, in practice, operated a blanket policy 
of retaining and using such data (see William and Johnson, 2008). The individuals in S. 
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and Marper argued that this practice was in violation of their right to respect for their 
private lives because the data in question Ôwere crucially linked to their individual 
identity and concerned a type of personal information that they were entitled to keep 
within their controlÕ (2008: para. 60). In asking the Court to recognize that the police 
had violated this aspect of their human rights, the individuals in S. and Marper were 
essentially looking to the Court to compel the United Kingdom government to 
strengthen the limitations on the capacity of the police to retain and use DNA 
samples/profiles and fingerprints taken from those charged with an offence but 
subsequently found not guilty.  
 
The Court held in S. and Marper that the indiscriminate and blanket retention of DNA 
samples/profiles and fingerprints constituted a disproportionate and unnecessary 
interference with the right to respect for private life. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court stated that the United Kingdom national authorities had failed to strike a fair 
balance between competing public and private interests in respect of a number of issues 
relating to the prevention and detection of crime. The Court was critical of English law 
that: allowed the retention and use of DNA samples/profiles and fingerprints regardless 
of the nature or gravity of the offence of which the individual was originally suspected 
or the age of the suspected offender; enabled the police to retain such material for an 
indefinite amount of time, even if the suspect was then deemed innocent; and provided 
very limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to have such materials destroyed or 
stop them being used. The Court explicitly stated that Ôit will be for the respondent State 
to implement, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers, appropriate general 
and/or individual measures to fulfil its obligations to secure the right of the applicants 
and other persons in their position to respect for their private lifeÕ (2008: para. 134). 
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In order to comply with the judgment in S. and Marper, the United Kingdom 
government revised, by way of primary legislation, the legal framework governing the 
retention and use of DNA samples/profiles and fingerprints by the police. Initially, the 
Crime and Security Act 2010 made a number of changes that included placing a limit on 
the amount of time that the police could retain DNA profiles and fingerprints taken 
from persons not subsequently convicted, and made special provisions for minors. 
However, the Committee of Ministers considered these reforms to be insufficient and 
requested that the national authorities make further changes to ensure, for example, that 
the circumstances under which the police could retain data from unconvicted persons 
adequately take into account the gravity of any offence for which individuals had 
originally been suspected. As a consequence, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
introduced a new legal regime that imposed stricter limitations on the circumstances 
under which the police may retain DNA profiles and fingerprints taken from 
unconvicted individuals depending on the gravity of the offence and the age of the 
suspected offender. Moreover, the government created an independent Commissioner 
for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material to keep under review the retention and 
use by the police of DNA samples/profiles and fingerprints. The Committee of 
Ministers regarded these changes to satisfy the requirements of the CourtÕs judgment. In 
essence, therefore, the CourtÕs judgment can be seen to have instigated ÔhardÕ control of 
the police designed to regulate their operational conduct.  
 
Both Moldovan and Others and S. and Marper demonstrate the ways in which human 
rights law can be used to effectively control the activities of state officials. In both 
cases, individuals utilized human rights law to create soft and hard controls over the 
action of state agents. Whilst it is generally recognized that Ôthe criminal law [É] 
regulates the conduct of state officials charged with processing citizens who are 
suspected, accused, or found guilty of crimeÕ (Skolnick, 1993: 18), S. and Marper 
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shows how human rights law can be used to challenge the criminal law in order to 
reshape the social control of state agents. Both cases demonstrate the capacity of human 
rights law to facilitate upward social control (Black, 1984). In this sense, human rights 
law can enable a form of Ôsocial control that a dependent party applies to a dominant 
partyÕ and, as Moldovan and Others illustrates, a form of social control that Ôresponds to 
downward deviance committed by dominants against dependentsÕ (Horwitz, 1990: 15). 
Although it has been argued that Ô[u]pward social control is relatively rare in the legal 
systemÕ (Mullis, 1995: 142), both cases show that when individuals successfully 
complain in the Court about the conduct of state agents the outcome is that national 
authorities may be required to adopt measures to prevent such conduct occurring in the 
future. For this reason, the Court, and human rights law generally, provides a powerful 
legal resource for those individuals wishing to control the behaviour of those ÔaboveÕ 
them. 
 
This does not mean that a successful application to the Court always achieves upward 
social control in the form of a reduction or curtailment of social control activities by 
state officials. In some cases, a successful application may provide a state with a basis 
on which to mandate the social control activity complained of. For example, in Malone 
v the United Kingdom (1984) a complaint about interception of postal and telephone 
communications and the ÔmeteringÕ of a telephone by or on behalf of the police was 
upheld by the Court on the basis of the Ôobscurity and uncertainty as to the state of the 
lawÕ which Ôdoes not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise 
of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authoritiesÕ (para. 79). To comply with 
the CourtÕs judgment, the UK Government enacted the Interception of Communications 
Act 1985 (subsequently the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016) to permit the Secretary of State to issue a warrant 
allowing interception of communications by post or a telecommunication system. This 
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action by the state, which was deemed satisfactory the Committee of Ministers (1986), 
therefore provided legal clarification of the social control activity complained of rather 
than preventing the activity occurring. In circumstances such as these, where a 
successful judgment does not remove the downward social control complained of, a 
further case would need to be taken to the Court to complain about the substance of the 
control activity.    
 
The social control of private individuals 
 
In this section we consider two cases, Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria (2007) and 
Alekseyev v Russia (2010), which concerned complaints about the failure of national 
authorities in Bulgaria and Russia to regulate the conduct of private individuals. In both 
cases, the Court upheld the complaints and, in doing so, required the Bulgarian and 
Russian governments to enhance or introduce new forms of regulation within their 
populations. The respective governments responded in very different ways to the Court: 
in Angelova and Iliev the Bulgarian authorities positively complied with the CourtÕs 
judgment whereas, as we noted above, in Alekseyev the Russian authorities continue to 
fail to implement the general measures necessary to comply with the CourtÕs judgment. 
These cases therefore illustrate that the extent to which human rights law can function 
as an effective mechanism of social control strongly relies upon the voluntary 
compliance of national authorities. 
 
In Angelova and Iliev, two Bulgarian individuals of Roma origin, who were respectively 
the mother and brother of a man who was killed by a group of teenagers, complained 
that Bulgarian authorities had failed to investigate and prosecute the racial 
discrimination aspect of the attack. In arguing before the Court that national authorities 
had consistently failed to address Ôsystematic patterns of violence and discrimination 
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against their [Roma] communityÕ by private individuals (2007: para. 107), the 
complainants were essentially asking the Court to compel the Bulgarian authorities to 
amend domestic criminal legislation to make Ôspecific provisions incriminating the 
offences of murder or serious bodily injury, or indeed any other felony, as separate 
criminal offences where the latter were racially motivatedÕ and include Ôexplicit 
penalty-enhancing provisions relating to racially motivated offencesÕ (2007: para. 77). 
In upholding the complaint, the Court considered that the national authorities had failed 
to make a distinction between racially motivated and other offences and that this was 
irreconcilable with the Convention. As a consequence, the Court required that the 
national authorities identify and implement appropriate measures to address offences 
committed by individuals or groups of individuals motivated by racial or ethnic hatred. 
The Court did not, however, explicitly require national authorities to introduce new 
criminal legislation, noting that Ôother means may also be employed to attain the desired 
result of punishing perpetrators who have racist motivesÕ (2007: para. 104).  
 
In order to comply with the CourtÕs judgment, the Bulgarian national authorities 
revised, by way of primary legislation, the law relating to offences motivated by hatred 
and introduced enhanced penalties for murder and bodily harm committed with racist or 
xenophobic motives. In so doing, the national authorities can be seen to have introduced 
a new regime of hard social control aimed at enhancing the investigation and 
prosecution of those engaging in racially motivated conduct. In order to show that this 
new regime satisfied the CourtÕs judgment, the Bulgarian authorities provided evidence 
of nearly 150 investigations of racially motivated offences that had been undertaken 
within five years of its introduction. The Committee of Ministers was satisfied that the 
Bulgarian government had adopted appropriate measures to Ôsecure proper investigation 
of possible racist motives of offences having resulted into death or injuryÕ and, on these 
grounds, decided to close the examination of the case (Resolution 383, Adopted by the 
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Committee of Ministers on 22 November 2017). As such, the CourtÕs judgment can be 
seen to have directly resulted in a tightening of social control of particular forms of 
conduct engaged in by private individuals. 
 
In Alekseyev, a Russian gay man complained to the Court about the repeated refusals by 
public officials in Moscow to allow a gay pride event to take place. In defence of these 
refusals, the Russian government argued, amongst other things, that restricting the 
public assembly of gay and lesbian people was necessary because of a number of threats 
made by religious groups. For example, the head Muslim authority of Nizhniy 
Novgorod had stated that Ôas a matter of necessity, homosexuals must be stoned to 
deathÕ (2010: para. 62) and, in light of this and other threats, the Russian government 
argued that it had been appropriate to refuse permission for public assemblies on safety 
grounds and for the protection of public order. In upholding the complaint, the Court 
stated that the response of the national authorities amounted to a violation of the 
Convention because individuals have the right to hold a public demonstration even if it 
Ômay annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking 
to promoteÕ and that individuals Ômust be able to hold the demonstration without having 
to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponentsÕ (2010: para. 
73). Where the threat of physical violence is present, the Court stated that the national 
authorities should have dealt with it Ôthrough the prosecution of those responsibleÕ 
(2010: para. 76). Consequently, the CourtÕs judgment effectively called for the social 
control of individuals seeking to incite hatred towards gay men and lesbians. 
 
In response to the CourtÕs judgment, the Russian government argued that domestic 
legislation and judicial practice were consistent with the standard of human rights 
protection required by the Convention and, therefore, that no general measures were 
needed to prevent a similar violation occurring in the future. Although the government 
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acknowledged that a number of requests to hold a gay pride march had continued to be 
rejected they contended that this was the result of procedural problems. Several Russian 
and international non-governmental organisations contested this account and submitted 
detailed reports Ð which have not been officially challenged by the Russian government 
Ð showing that Russian authorities have refused more than 100 applications for gay 
pride events on the grounds of general Ôsecurity threatsÕ (Communication 790 from 
NGOs, Considered by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 2012). These 
reports also allege that extremist groups have become more active in coordinating the 
targeted harassment of gay, lesbian and transgender individuals who take part in public 
events. For example, it has been reported that public assemblies of LGBT individuals 
are increasingly disrupted by groups who engage in verbal and physical abuse and that 
police largely fail to prevent or address these incidents (Communication 228 from 
NGOs, Considered by the Committee of Ministers on 6 March 2014; Communication 
from 253 a NGO, Considered by the Committee of Ministers on 9 December 2016). The 
Committee of Ministers has repeatedly urged the Russian government to adopt 
measures to ensure that all citizens can effectively enjoy the right of public assembly 
without discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. However, to date, the 
Committee of Ministers has not been satisfied with the governmentÕs response and the 
Court has since gone on to find that Russia has further violated the Convention because 
of the existence of so-called Ôhomosexual propagandaÕ laws (see Johnson, 2015) that 
prohibit public statements concerning the identity, rights and social status of sexual 
minorities (Bayev and Others v Russia, 2017: para. 84).  
 
The common feature of Angelova and Iliev and Alekseyev is that the complainants in 
both cases sought to use the Court as a mechanism for instigating new forms of social 
control of private individuals. Insofar as both cases were successful in the Court, all of 
the complainants can be seen to have utilized human rights law to authorize new forms 
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of inward social control (Horwitz, 1990) through which the ÔmarginalÕ in a society 
regulate the conduct of the ÔintegratedÕ (Horwitz, 1990: 14). In practice, however, these 
cases demonstrate that such control will only come into existence if governments 
voluntarily comply with the CourtÕs judgments. Angelova and Iliev shows the 
effectiveness of the Convention system for achieving the better regulation of the 
conduct of individuals (anti-Roma individuals) that are motivated by hatred of other 
individuals (Roma people) in contemporary Bulgaria. By contrast, Alekseyev 
demonstrates the failure of the Convention system for achieving the regulation of the 
conduct of individuals (anti-gay individuals) that are motivated by hatred of other 
individuals (gay people) in contemporary Russia. The key to the success or failure of 
the Convention system in these cases Ð which is the key to making the Convention 
system an effective mechanism of social control more generally Ð is the willingness of a 
respondent government to positively comply with a judgment of the Court by, in 
circumstances like these, instigating control of individuals. When a respondent 
government does positively comply with a judgment of the Court, the Convention 
system can act as an important mechanism for reshaping mechanisms of social control 
that regulate how private individuals can behave towards each other in contemporary 
societies.  
 
Legitimizing social control  
 
In the previous sections we have demonstrated how the Convention system can be used 
to challenge and facilitate changes to patterns of social control in contemporary 
European societies. Such changes obviously unsettle previously established modes of 
social control favoured by state and other actors. However, there is a way in which the 
Convention system can act as a mechanism for legitimizing those forms of control that 
are preferred by the state. This happens when, as a result of a complaint to the Court, a 
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respondent government successfully defends an impugned aspect of social control. In 
this section we consider two cases, Vala!inas v Lithuania (2001) and Ramirez Sanchez v 
France (2005, 2006), which demonstrate how the Court can come to mandate forms of 
social control chosen by the state. Both cases concern, amongst other things, complaints 
about placing convicted individuals who are detained in prison in solitary confinement. 
In both cases the Court rejected the complaints and therefore did not require the 
Lithuanian or French government to implement any general measures to comply with 
the Convention (in both cases the Court did find violations of the Convention in respect 
of other matters complained of, which we do not discuss).  
 
In Vala!inas, a Lithuanian individual complained about being subjected to a period Ð 
described by the Court as ÔshortÕÐ of 15 days of solitary confinement whilst detained in 
prison (Vala!inas, 2001: para. 112). In Ramirez Sanchez, a Venezuelan individual 
complained about being subjected to prolonged periods of solitary confinement, which 
on one occasion had lasted for eight years and two months, whilst detained in prison in 
France. In arguing before the Court that their solitary confinement amounted to 
Ôinhuman and degrading treatmentÕ in violation of the Convention (Vala!inas, 2001: 
para. 3; Ramirez Sanchez, 2005: para. 66), both complainants can be seen to have 
shared the ambition of using the Court as a means to compel the Lithuanian and French 
governments to limit the capacity of prison authorities to confine prisoners in isolation. 
Both cases can be understood to frame the conduct of state officials as forms of 
Ôdownward devianceÕ that require greater social control (Horwitz, 1990: 15). Had the 
Court upheld these complaints it would have facilitated upward social control, like in 
the cases that we described above, of the prison authorities by the individual 
complainants.  
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In rejecting the complaints in Vala!inas and Ramirez Sanchez the Court held that the 
conditions of the individualsÕ detention did not attain the minimum level of severity 
amounting to treatment contrary to the Convention (Vala!inas, 2001: para. 112; 
Ramirez Sanchez, 2006: para. 150). In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the 
practice of placing prisoners in solitary confinement could not be considered as a 
violation of human rights per se (Ramirez Sanchez, 2005: para. 110). The Court 
acknowledged that prisoners must not be subjected to distress of Ôan intensity exceeding 
the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detentionÕ (Vala!inas, 2001: para. 102; 
Ramirez Sanchez, 2006: para. 119), that Ôcomplete sensory isolation, coupled with total 
social isolationÕ cannot be justified by Ôthe requirements of security or any other reasonÕ 
(Ramirez Sanchez, 2005: para. 100), and that solitary confinement Ôcannot be imposed 
on a prisoner indefinitelyÕ (Ramirez Sanchez, 2006: para. 145). However, the Court did 
not consider that the complaints advanced in Vala!inas and Ramirez Sanchez were 
contrary to these principles. 
 
In rejecting the applicantsÕ complaints, the Court can be seen to implicitly legitimize 
forms of downward social control used by states. This is because the CourtÕs judgments 
effectively endorse the statesÕ chosen ways of dealing with the behaviour of individuals 
regarded to be criminal or deviant. The judgments mandate the use of solitary 
confinement by national authorities in the circumstances complained of and, moreover, 
offer considerable scope for national authorities to use solitary confinement in a range 
of other circumstances. For example, in Ramirez Sanchez, the Court held that holding a 
person convicted of terrorist attacks in solitary confinement for prolonged periods of 
time was justified Ôhaving regard to all [É] considerationsÕ (2006: para. 150), which 
included recognizing that Ô[i]n the modern world, States face very real difficulties in 
protecting their populations from terrorist violenceÕ (2006: para. 116). In this respect, 
the Court explicitly stated that it is ÔunderstandableÕ that national authorities, in certain 
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circumstances, combine detention with Ôextraordinary security measuresÕ (Ramirez 
Sanchez, 2006: para. 125). This therefore establishes wide parameters in which national 
authorities may legitimately use extensive periods of solitary confinement to address 
particular problems in Ôthe modern worldÕ without falling foul of the Convention. More 
generally, the judgments give the imprimatur of the Court to particular social control 
practices and enable those state agents engaging in such practices to claim that they are, 
and have been officially recognized as being, respectful of fundamental human rights.   
 
Conclusions  
 
In this article we have examined the relationship between human rights law and social 
control. In doing so, we have critically considered how human rights law, like other 
forms of law, can fulfil social control functions. Through an analysis of a purposive 
sample of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and the execution of 
some of these judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, we 
have evaluated the ways in which human rights law can sustain or reshape aspects and 
practises of social control in contemporary societies.  
 
As we have shown, human rights law provides an arena in which competing parties can 
contest what should be regarded as deviant and, therefore, what requires social control. 
In taking complaints to the Court, individuals often seek to use human rights law as a 
means to ÔlabelÕ particular forms of individual or group conduct as deviant and instigate 
social control of it. By contrast, in defending themselves against complaints in the 
Court, national governments seek to establish that their social control practices are 
compatible with human rights law and therefore acceptable. In its adjudication of these 
competing perspectives, the Court issues judgments that, as we have shown, can form 
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the basis for types of social control that Ôharmonizes clashing activities by checking 
some and stimulating othersÕ (Ross, 1896: 519).  
 
We have discussed three key ways in which human rights law is implicated in 
contemporary forms of social control. First, we have shown how, as a result of 
successfully complaining in the Court about the conduct of state agents, individuals are 
able to use human rights law as a means for achieving upward social control of those 
state agents. Secondly, we have demonstrated that, as a result of successfully 
complaining in the Court about the failure of national authorities to regulate the conduct 
of private individuals, complainants are able to use human rights law as a means of 
achieving inward social control. Thirdly, we have shown how, when the Court rejects a 
complaint about an aspect of social control, human rights law can endorse a stateÕs 
chosen strategy for responding to behaviours it regards as problematic and, 
consequently, legitimize downward social control. 
 
Because human rights law provides a powerful resource to challenge and reshape 
existing patterns of social control in contemporary societies, the Court is an attractive 
venue for individual litigants. Despite the limitations that are inherent in the system for 
ensuring the enforcement of the CourtÕs judgments, individual complainants know that 
the Court provides a means of compelling national authorities to change or implement 
new forms of social control. However, when individual complaints fail in the Court, 
existing social control practices in states are given significant legitimacy. Given that the 
vast majority of complaints to the Court are unsuccessful Ð in 2017, for example, 
approximately 82% of applications judicially disposed of by the Court were declared 
inadmissible or struck out (European Court of Human Rights, 2017) Ð human rights law 
can be seen to play an important role in maintaining the status quo of many aspects of 
social control in contemporary societies. This aspect of human rights law, which is 
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rarely explicitly acknowledged, provides state actors with a powerful rhetorical resource 
by which to defend the actions they take against individuals or groups.  
 
In focusing on one international court we have attempted to reveal a relationship 
between human rights law and social control that can be further investigated in respect 
of other jurisdictions. Human rights law is administered by several courts operating at a 
supranational level around the world Ð for example, the African Court on Human and 
PeoplesÕ Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Ð as well as by courts 
within nation states. Each international and national system for administering human 
rights law has different mechanisms for adjudicating complaints and ensuring the 
execution of judgments. Further studies of these systems will reveal the ways in which 
they are implicated in the patterns of social control found in contemporary societies and, 
specifically, the extent to which human rights law enables, produces and sustains the 
regulation of individuals.  
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